Shared Culture, Divergent Statecraft

Islamabad, Delhi, Dhaka. What do they all have in common? Alongside serving as the capital for their respective countries, which were once classified as ‘India’, collectively, the cities seem to be distinct in their policy choices. Thus, propelling one to think that maybe sharing the same culture and history is not sufficient to bind people together. As sharing the same religion is not equivalent to sharing the same nationality, the events of 1971  that culminated in the creation of an independent state of Bangladesh serve as evidence of this statement. Yet, across Islamabad, Delhi, and Dhaka, this awareness seems to be absent as politicians and policymakers across the cities seem to be engrossed in interfering in their neighbouring nations’ local affairs for decades. Whether this be the support Delhi has provided to Bangladesh’s ex-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, or Islamabad’s support for the Khalistan movement based in India’s Punjab. However, the economic trajectories of all three nations seem to recognize that these three cities possibly represent three different worlds, thttps://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/indicator/sl-tlf-acti-zs?geos=BGD_IND_NPL_PAK_LKA&view=barhree different nations.

Each of these countries has access to a menu of ways with which it can present itself internationally: as a moral leader, as a strong economic partner, or as a proxy that other countries use as a way to fight battles that they themselves would not want to lead. These countries look at the same menu and pick up options that are completely different because the foreign ministries of these countries do not make decisions independently but rather delegate that authority to the powerful elite of the country. If the powerful elite wants international attention and recognition, the foreign policy objectives are broadened. However, if the elite does not want that, then the objectives are narrowed. Thus, criticism on the country’s economy and its regression does not bother them. 

India’s nominal GDP accounts for 4.15 trillion dollars, Bangladesh comes second with a GDP of 510.7 billion dollars, and Pakistan comes third at 407.9 billion dollars. India has made its transition to an economy that levies its burden on service industries, the IT and technology sector. The services  sector currently contributes around 54% to the country’s GDP. A number that is predicted to grow further in the future. Pakistan, on the other hand, still derives most of its economic output from the agricultural industry, which contributes 23.4% of the GDP. Bangladesh, on the other hand, derives 51% of its GDP from the services industry, whilst the ready-made garment and textile industry takes the forefront in the international sector. Bangladesh incorporates its informal sector into its GDP as well. This ends up making Bangladesh’s economy have the highest female labour participation (39%)  amongst the three countries. These differences would make one assume that the countries have vastly different cultures and religions. 

However, all three countries trace their origin back to the Indus Civilization, and all three have cuisines and art forms that are strikingly similar. For example, at the Social Business Day Conference in Bangladesh, the cultural dance that opened the conference looked strikingly similar to the one seen in Bollywood movies set in the Indian province of Bengal. Even the food at the conference bore a resemblance to the food consumed in Pakistan. These similarities are baffling, as one wonders why they do not translate into the countries’ economies.

The primary difference remains between how Delhi, Islamabad, and Dhaka navigate their policy-making decisions. Islamabad had taken decisions in haste that have resulted in the country’s involvement in historic events such as the Soviet War, which led to an influx of immigrants into the country. Immigrants that the government did not have the means to deal with, resulting in tensions between the immigrants and locals, which culminated in a culture of terrorism across the country. That decision brought millions of dollars into Pakistan, dollars that were sufficient enough to execute the economic plans the government had planned, dollars that were sufficient enough to keep the ruling party of Pakistan in America’s Good Books. That decision also led to the formation of a klashinklov and drug culture in the country. That affected the masses. Yet, even today the elite of the country are ready to take on meetings with the American Presidency, but little to nothing is done about the PKR-to-dollar exchange rate, which keeps on soaring higher and higher. 

On the other hand, Delhi wants to put India on the map, for which the country needs to advance itself technologically, but the power only serves the elite. Hence, as national examination papers get leaked in India, the government does not worry because those in power have their futures secured. Dhaka is still learning to operate; institutions such as the Grameen Bank have made the economy accessible to many, but politicians seem to be averse to that, as during the 2024 revolutions, the founder of the Grameen Bank, Dr Muhammad Yunus, faced several death threats.

Thus, whilst sharing similar cultures results in these nations having a similar set of institutions. The activities of those institutions depend on how the foreign ministries of these countries choose to represent themselves internationally. And whether their vision is supported by the powerful elite of the country or not. For example, India’s foreign policy under the leadership of the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi has increasingly utilized big businesses as diplomatic apparatuses. Here, capital is welcomed because the ones prompting its growth are those without whose support the government itself would be dysfunctional. 

So where does all of this leave Islamabad, Delhi and Dhaka at the present? Islamabad seems to be leaning into establishing strong economic ties with countries in various geographical regions. Alongside, further deepening its dependence on Chinese investment, it has also welcomed the UAE’S $1 billion stake in the Fauji Foundation. It should be considered that the Fauji Foundation is an entity of the military and has also been previously in the news due to its monopolization over private markets. Thus, while the aim is to transform Pakistan into a reliable economic partner, the benefits of that reputation seem to be going into selected pockets. Delhi plans on making itself stronger in industries such as en energy whilst also drawing in international attention by hosting summits. Whilst the elite want power, the approach is more thought through; rather than declaring itself as self-sufficient immediately, Delhi has locked in FTAS with the United Kingdom and the European Union. Dhaka has recently signed a free trade deal with South Korea. The trade gives 97% of Bangladeshi goods access to the roughly 2 trillion-dollar Korean market. This deal arises from the trust fostered in Bangladesh’s Bank by organizations such as the Grameen Bank and its microcredit program. Time will tell if those in power in Dhaka will let that trust be fostered or merely use it to gain credit for themselves.

Cultural similarity does not produce foreign policy decisions; domestic institutions and the ruling elite do. Delhi, Dhaka and Islamabad share a common regional history, yet each has pursued a distinct foreign policy path based on who holds power and who the institutions chose to prioritize.