The Hidden Powers of Maritime Coercion
Through its ability to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, Iran has demonstrated that geopolitical influence is not determined solely by military power. Rather, in an era of global economic interdependence, maritime coercion has emerged as one of the most effective instruments by which regional powers can generate leverage, far beyond what their military and economic capabilities would otherwise permit.
Situated between Iran and Oman (Britannica, 2026), The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most strategically significant waterways in the world. Although it is relatively narrow, its tightest point being ‘only 29 nautical miles wide (54 km)’ (IEA, 2025), the Strait of Hormuz serves as the primary gateway between the Persian Gulf and the wider global economy. Its importance has been known for centuries.
In 1507, Portuguese military leader, Afonso de Albuquerque seized the Island of Hormuz (Livermore, 2019), recognising that, in order to siege a region’s wealth, one does not necessarily need to have control over all of its territories, only the exit. This strategic importance remained evident during the war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988) about who would have ‘regional dominance’ (Howlett, 2026). Specifically, during the 1984 ‘Tanker War’ (Howlett, 2026), both nations fought over the Strait by targeting oil tankers and commercial shipping to disrupt each other’s access to international markets. This warranted international attention and a United States led naval intervention in 1987, since the conflict began to affect the security of the global energy supply chain. The situation remains pertinent today. Following the US and Israeli strikes on 28th February 2026, Iran launched a ‘series of counter-strikes’ (Loft, 2026), with Tehran declaring that ‘No vessel is allowed to cross the Strait of Hormuz following the attacks launched by the US and Israel against Iran.’ (Tasnim News Agency, 2026).
‘Around a quarter of global seaborne oil trade’ (UN Trade and Development, 2026) flows through the Strait. Since the beginning of the war, the price of oil has fluctuated unpredictably and ‘prices surged more than 55% since the start of the war’ (Graham and Shan, 2026). However, the significance of this closure extends far beyond energy. Around ‘one-third’ of the world’s fertiliser (Gordon and Corthell, 2026) passes through the same route. To put it simply, the less fertiliser available, the higher the cost of growing crops, which ultimately has led to higher food prices (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2026). This reality reveals how Iran has an important strategic advantage.
As a result of the US strikes on Iranian infrastructure, a substantial proportion of Iran’s leadership was eliminated. In addition to this, ‘ballistic and cruise missile and drone capabilities, as well as its defence-industrial base, air defences, command and communication hubs’ were destroyed together with ‘naval systems, coastal radars and nuclear facilities’ (Motamedi, 2026). Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that Iran does not possess the military capability necessary to exert such significant leverage over the global economy. Nevertheless, with the Gulf essentially being a dead end, the geographical nature of the Strait means that there are no worthwhile ‘alternative export routes’ (IEA, 2025). Hence, Iran has exploited geography to exceed power beyond its military weight, illuminating the logic behind maritime coercion.
More significantly, Tehran’s willingness to absorb the economic, military and diplomatic costs associated with threatening the Strait, reveals a regime that is operating from a position of relative weakness. As it is unable to match the military power and economic resources of the US and its allies directly, Iran has instead turned to asymmetrical forms of coercion that increase the costs of continued pressure against it. By displaying its ability to disrupt a maritime chokepoint, through which a substantial share of global resources pass, Iran does not seek to defeat stronger adversaries physically, but to alter their strategic calculations. This demonstrates how regional powers can exploit global interdependence to gain leverage, using disruption of the international supply chain and geography to influence stronger states, despite having weaker military capabilities. However, more significantly it shows that Tehran remains unwilling to surrender despite intense diplomatic pressure, signalling its readiness to escalate if they perceive their core interests are to be at risk. Rather than accepting the coercion of stronger states, Iran seeks to show the world that vulnerability does not necessarily mean compliance and has instead chosen to engage in a high-risk tactic designed to alter its opponents’ calculations and strengthen its own bargaining position. The consequences extend far beyond the Middle East, affecting governments, businesses and consumers all across the world.
In terms of the future, Iran’s actions have sent shockwaves across the global stage which have altered dynamics for generations to come. It has simultaneously created new vulnerabilities and has shown how a state with limited conventional power can gain significant influence. In the 21st Century, having military strength will not be sufficient alone, one must also have the ability to threaten critical nodes within the global supply chain. In this respect, maritime chokepoints are increasingly being used as strategic instruments rather than economic lifelines.
As geopolitical competition intensifies and the world continues to become further fragmented, the importance of these systems, and who has jurisdiction over them, are likely to grow. Governments should be aware of the broader lesson learned from this conflict: that the world is dependent on an uninterrupted flow of resources and that geography is just as powerful, if not more so, than military capability in shaping international outcomes.