
Germany has increasingly relied on Kazakhstan as an alternative to Russian oil supplies, importing about 10.3 million tonnes of Kazakh oil in 2025 (Cutler 2026). This month showed how dependent this trade still is on Russia's willingness. Moscow has cut off deliveries of Kazakh oil through the Druzhba pipeline since May 1 this year, and it has not yet answered Astana's request on November 4 to resume flows (Cutler 2026). At the same time, Ukrainian drone strikes have been hitting Russian infrastructure that also delivers Kazakhstan's rerouted oil, while the only route for shipping Kazakh oil to Europe that bypasses Russia (via the Caspian Sea) is still limited. Though, this route is slowly expanding.
Two kinds of exposure
Kazakhstan's vulnerability is due to both political and physical reasons. For example, about 80% of its oil exports in 2025 were transported through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to Russia's Black Sea coast (Bland 2026). Kazakhstan's second most significant route, the Atyrau Samara pipeline, also crosses through Russian territory (Bland 2026). Moscow stated that it halted the Druzhba pipeline due to technical reasons. Regardless of Russia’s reasoning and Kazakhstan’s Energy and Trade policy ambitions, it is Russia that ultimately controls deliveries to Europe through its infrastructure.
At the same time however, both of these routes are now under fire. The drone strike on November 2 at the Samara dispatch center resulted in the stoppage of the Atyrau-Samara pipeline's operation for a day (Bland 2026), while additional Ukrainian strikes on November 11 hit the Baltic port Ust-Luga (ArmyInform 2026), which Kazakhstan had been using for its rerouted oil (Interfax 2026). Despite Kazakhstan's efforts to reroute its oil and stay away from the conflict, its exports still cross through targets for drone strikes.
The Caspian alternative and new moderators
Under the Caspian Sea route, tankers carry Kazakh crude from Aktau to Azerbaijan, where they are then loaded into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which runs across Georgia and Türkiye (via Ceyhan the crude oil accesses the Mediterranean as well). As Kazakhstan seeks to expand on this route, shipments in the first 9 months have increased by 24% year-on-year, reaching 1.16 million tonnes, though it is still only a small share of the CPC's volume and below this year's 1.7-million-tonne target (Kubaizhanov 2026). Talks with Azerbaijan this month raised the idea of delivering 7 million tonnes per year (Kubaizhanov 2026), but terms remain unclear in regards to tariffs and its effect on Azerbaijan's Azeri Light blend (Cutler 2026).
This change in export routes has the potential to change regional alignments. Baku and Tbilisi effectively become moderators over the connection between Kazakhstan and Europe, providing the Caucasus nations with additional leverage on both Astana and Brussels. Simultaneously, on the European side of affairs, Germany possesses fewer tools than their ambitions suggest. Germany's state-owned bank KfW’s standard lending rules exclude crude pipelines and terminals (Cutler 2026). Additionally, none of the allocated €400 million in its budget for
upgrades to the Rostock port and its connection to the Schwedt refinery were spent in 2025 (Cutler 2026)
Why it matters
Europe has diversified its sources, but it has not escaped Russia’s supply chain. It has only shifted Russia's influence onto other countries. For Astana, "multi-vector" foreign relations, which seeks to balance relations with Russia, China and the West, works only while the pipelines remain open and the war stays away from them. Neither condition is a reliable one to hope for anymore.