Climate Overshoot and COP31: Outlook on UN Global Governance
With global temperatures expected to exceed 1.5 °C, what impact will this have on Türkiye's political and physical climate, and what can be expected at the upcoming COP31?
Within the global climate change response, the actionability presented by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) through Limiting Overshoot – Navigating exceedance of 1.5°C and pathways towards return, outline the needs and expectations for the upcoming COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye. As with many international power imbalances, temperature exceedance and shifting climate patterns have historically affected less developed, lower-GDP countries, even though they contribute less to climate change than larger polluters, who hold greater climate protections and greater capacity to respond. Through understanding the report and the systemic issues it interacts with, expectations and needs for the 31st Conference of the Parties (COP31) are made clear. Analysis of the UNEP publication, the political climate within Türkiye, and relevant climate insight will inform expectations and recommendations for COP31 to support and empower small island developing nations (SIDS) for realistic climate goals under intense pressure.
Understanding overshoot and rising temperatures
The UNEP report is contextualised on a global scale, creating a nexus between developing and highly climate-affected countries as well as critically examining the international pollution producers. The previously determined path dependency of climate change response by international actors was immediately critiqued, as the development of scientific advancements and the growing global effects of climate disasters become more immediate and extreme. This report clearly recognises that in terms of global temperatures and degrees, there is little hope of turning back, but a stronger likelihood of mitigating effects. Discussed through the language of overshoot pathways, this recognises that the world will exceed the 1.5°C threshold but highlights the urgency of bringing the number down again within a rebound phase (UNEP, 2026). Similar to an understanding of economic elasticity, this depends on comprehension of the overshoot, peak, and decline patterns of global climate temperatures and the need to break from dependence on traditional climate adaptation techniques, instead turning towards resilience and mitigation to cope with the inevitable rise.
The formal recognition of the point of no return by a UN body highlights the change in tone and approach to the climate crisis through recognition of political failures that entrench extractive and exploitative practices. Throughout the report, it is highlighted that the actions and work necessary are based on governance and political decision-making capacity rather than purely a physical environmental response. The practices and pressures of international partnerships and global climate cooperation mandates are directly recognised through requiring global governance in working towards a just transition, as in equitably transferring actors from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy (UNEP, 2026). This practice is inclusive of individuals and communities, and is intended to integrate green economy techniques of climate awareness and anticipation.
Accessible or selective development?
In November 2026, Türkiye will host COP31 and therefore determine the themes and focus of the entire international summit. Foundational to global governance and stability, Turkish Minister Murat Kurum highlights that the “priorities span a wide field: electrification, zero waste, food security, resilient cities, green industrialization, youth participation, health and education” (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2026). The scope of these goals recognises the foundational and integral position of COP31 as an international mechanism for cooperation and empowerment, which fails to hold parties accountable and create binding and enforceable limitations on actors, as parties or non-parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC).
Inequality, development, access, and inclusion have been touted as the focus of this summit with a clear disconnect. In contrast with these practices, the September crackdowns on the LGBTQ+ community within Türkiye, particularly in the western coastal city of Izmir, have led to violent arrests and protests against the central government. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights calls the arrests and restrictions unjustified, creating a tense atmosphere just a month before the summit (Council of Europe, 2026). The idea of global cooperation and inclusive development is inherently contradictory to this, further complicating strained political and social relations. This functions to make specific populations politically and socially invisible, and these contradictions highlight the political fallacy of inclusive and active global governance.
The focus of the COP31 works along preexisting regional and institutional frameworks of cooperation to bridge public and private sectors within multilateral coalitions to realise targets. The financial focus on investment-ready projects aligns with global environmental standards to increase clean energy and turn towards a shift in policy adoption and implementation (UNEP, 2026). As the date grows closer and global temperatures continue to rise, we can be sure the COP31 summit will highlight the inaccessibility, lack of accountability, and exclusion ingrained within international political mechanisms. The political climate of Türkiye as the host country sets the tone of political selectivity and inherent exclusion of minority and systemically disempowered actors.
International action and capacity
In June of 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) published an advisory opinion on the Obligations of States Regarding Climate Change, ultimately concluding it is the state’s duty to lower greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs) and protect the climate system (ICJ, 2025). This aligns with the legal precedent of erga omnes (towards all) to signify the responsibility of a state to the international community, congruent with the idea of the “greater good” (UN International Law Commission, 2025). This foundation within COP31 further reinforces the innate power imbalances within the formal international system, as the US is no longer a party to the UNFCCC and does not intend to send a federal delegate (The White House, 2026). The selective engagement and adoption of these resolutions align with the vulnerability of a nation, as those contributing to the issue are less enthusiastic about accountability and engagement.
With a focus on Low and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), the attending parties at COP31 will include and further involve states that have been increasingly vulnerable to climate change disasters and emergencies. As the host nation is able to set the agenda, Türkiye was originally at odds with Australia, which partnered with the Pacific Islands to potentially host and highlight the regional vulnerabilities ( ). Climate policy and international initiatives have worked to recentre Small Island Developing States (SIDS), further attempting to shift the power imbalance between influence and impact regarding carbon emissions and climate reliance. The inherent dependence of an island nation heightens the debt pressure that restricts resilience-based climate action and sustainable internal development. This empowers larger nations with structured loan plans, and limits the national capacity of SIDS whilst capacitating multinational institutions and financial actors.
Displacement, political instability, and dependence are recognised through attempts to integrate a just transition on an international scale, starting with further integration of blue economy approaches to protect livelihoods and habitats. Within an EU Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), published data on the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) contributors highlighted the US, China and India, as the top three parties (EDGAR, 2026). As President Trump withdrew the US from more than 60 international institutions in February of 2026, the US is no longer a part of the UNFCCC and failed to send a federal delegation to COP30, although individuals and state representatives did attend (America Is All In, 2026). China and Indonesia, both within the top five of global polluters, sent some of the largest delegations to COP30 and have displayed increased political engagement and adoption of resolutions in national political structures (Carbon Brief, 2025).
Future forward
The political climate within Türkiye builds upon the complex and deeply interwoven power hierarchies that align with climate vulnerabilities, as more powerful nations contribute more to pollution and climate change, whilst simultaneously being increasingly responsive to and protected from its impacts. The timing of the briefing before COP31 was deliberate, with an intentional focus on inclusion, transition, and shared growth. Under the guidance and agenda set by Türkiye and the international scope of resilience, adaptation, and mitigation techniques, ensuring actionable and inclusive programming responsive to overshoot pathways will be increasingly dependent on North-South collaboration. Increased integration and localised environmental programming responses are dependent on this political and social hierarchy, which may be represented better next year at COP32 in Ethiopia in 2027.